

Summaries of Papers from File "State-Four Problems-NSC 50"  
in Mr. Reber's Office

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OSO Memo to Chief, ICAPS  
Subject: Implementation of NSC 50

12 August 1949

- I. Coordination - necessity for coordination of overseas collection as well as coordination of the Washington research program is evident

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- III. Responsibility for Research and Reports - need for more basic research on Communism and the USSR. Until groundwork is laid, operational intelligence in these fields is impeded.

s/ Robert A. Schow  
Assistant Director

ORE Memo to DCI and Chief, ICAPS  
Subject: Implementation of NSC 50

15 August 1949

1. ORE in fundamental disagreement with the Armstrong proposals
  - a. Denies assumption that NSC 50 approved specific organizational changes in CIA as suggested in Dulles Report
  - b. Denies effectiveness of NSCID's in defining CIA intelligence activities and relations to IAC agencies --- special opposition to #'s 1 and 3
  - c. Armstrong's definition of national intelligence considered poor
2.
  - a. CIA should not negotiate with IAC agencies on Armstrong proposals pertaining to internal organization.
  - b. First priority for IAC negotiation and NSC action is revision of NSCID's 1 and 3. This would cover most of the other Armstrong proposals.
  - c. In view of a and b the Armstrong proposals should be withdrawn from IAC consideration.

Proposed revision of NSCID # 1 appended  
Proposed revision of NSCID # 3 stated as <sup>being</sup> in preparation  
Specific Comments on Armstrong Proposals appended

s/ Theodore Babbitt  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

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ICAPS Comments on State Recommendations (NSC 50) 16 August 1949

I. Coordination of Intelligence Activities

Recommendation 1 - concurrence, with minor change  
Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 4a, 4b - concurrence with minor rewording  
Recommendations 4c and 4d - concurrence  
Recommendation 4e - does not concur --- involves whole question of CIA's original production effort  
Recommendation 4f - does not concur --- CIA cannot give personnel assistance as part of its coordination function

II. Production of National Intelligence

Recommendations 1 and 1a - nonconcurrence---definition of national intelligence too restrictive for CIA  
Recommendation 1b - concurrence --- with understanding that obligation to avoid duplication of effort is mutual, applying to IAC agencies as well as to CIA  
Recommendation 1c - non concurrence --- in many situations, not only "crisis" ones, CIA cannot consult IAC agencies when preparing national intelligence  
Recommendations 2 and 3 - concurrence

III. Research and Reports

Recommendation 1 - nonconcurrence --- restricts CIA too much to IAC jurisdiction --- ignores claims of NSC on CIA facilities  
Recommendation 2 - concurrence

IV. Political Summaries

Recommendation 1 - ICAPS requests clarification --- says daily and weekly summaries not solely political

Covering memo signed by Prescott Childs states that the ICAPS comments were formulated after consideration of the ORE Memo of 15 August 1949.

Memo for Chief, ICAPS

24 August 1949

Subject: Clarification of Points in Mr. Armstrong's Submittal (obtained by Mr. Shane MacCarthy in conference with Mr. Allan Evans, Director of the Office of Intelligence & Research, Department of State)

- I - 1 - Evans sees no conflict between ICAPS acting as DCI Staff and also performing IAC staff functions --- State's desire is assurance of adequate staff work for IAC.
- I - 3 - ICAPS members would no longer be on the Standing Committee of IAC.
- I - 4 - Evans feels that the Estimates Division is best for coordinating function even though NSC granted CIA more leeway in performance of this duty
- I - 4a - CIA should be center of information on foreign intelligence activities, not information.
- I - 4b - This is meant to involve departmental regulation of policy as well as security.
- I - 4f - CIA's personnel assistance in particular cases can avoid establishment of functions on a duplicated basis --- in cases which demand only short-term help to enable some IAC agency to fulfill a requirement and obviate the necessity for CIA's setting up a new division.
  
- II - 1a - Evans emphasizes that NSCID definitions of national intelligence need no revision. He is only emphasizing them.
- II - 1b - Evans feels that CIA does not always live up to DCI 3/1 with its emphasis on use of departmental facilities whenever possible.
- II - 2 - This means discussion by IAC members, not agencies --- may help cut the number of dissents on national estimates
  
- III - 1 - Weak agreement from Evans that CIA did possibly have authority to do some production of departmental-type intelligence under certain circumstances.
  
- IV - 1 - Evans did not feel strongly about this recommendation--- felt it pertained more to weekly than to daily summaries

s/ Shane MacCarthy

Memo for the Director  
Subject: State's Four Problems

31 August 1949

1. Enclosure - first draft of the agreed positions resulting from the 30 August meeting of the Standing Committee of IAC.
2. Crux of the matter is that State thinks ORE/CIA conflicts with its own OIR and should be discontinued. The situation should be clarified by NSC to obviate friction.
3. Consideration of pps. 7,8,9 of "Analysis of ORE Production" 19 July 1949, compiled by the Ad Hoc Production and Review Committee in ORE, may help establish some division of responsibilities.
4. Problem of State's proprietary feelings toward all political intelligence can probably be more easily met.

s/ Prescott Childs  
Chief, ICAPS

Enclosed is Proposed Draft of Memo for IAC 1 September 1949--- covers Problem I, substantially in agreement with the final draft of CI A views (30 December 1949)

Memo for the Standing Committee, IAC

8 September 1949

1. Department of Defense representatives on the Standing Committee submit the following comments and recommendations relative to the Department of State proposals now under consideration
  - a. Functions of ICAPS and the Standing Committee of IAC
    - (1) Clarification is quite necessary
    - (2) Defense ideas on the subject:
      - (a) ICAPS:
        - Full time members from IAC agencies
        - Responsible to DCI
        - Unbiased comprehensive reporting and staff work on policies presented by IAC agencies
        - Function as IAC & Standing Committee secretariat
        - Other duties as directed by DCI
      - (b) Standing Committee/IAC
        - At least one representative of each IAC agency
        - Review, for IAC, matters referred by IAC or ICAPS--- should have no formal voting
2. Recommend approval of foregoing in substance
3. Suggest ICAPS staff action on remaining Department of State proposals

Minutes of SC/IAC meeting

8 September 1949

Comments on ICAPS --- Need for "charter" for ICAPS expressed  
Defense proposals still retain 2 masters for ICAPS --- DCI & IAC  
Counter-proposals would give ICAPS duties for only the DCI

No complete agreement on this question